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have examined the mineral/royalty distinction a number of times
over the years. When one's name is linked with a topic in an index
entry, it is easy to surmise that one may have said enough on the
subject. In John Lowe's Oil and Gas Law, the index entry, "MAX-
WELL, RICHARD Mineral/royalty distinction, 129"1 refers to the state-
ment: "Richard Maxwell suggests that the real distinction between a
mineral interest and a royalty is that a royalty is free of costs of produc-
tion while a mineral interest is subject to expenses."' 2 I first published this
modest proposition in 1955,3 and my latest comments on some of the im-
plications of the idea were published in 1994.4 Related studies appeared
in the intervening years, some of which will be cited when appropriate.
Whether my perennial concern with this topic is analogous to deep min-
ing or seasonal plowing is for others to judge.
My long connection with this niche of oil and gas law brings to mind a
conversation some years ago with Kenneth Pye (then Chancellor of Duke
University) during which Kenneth mentioned that certain appointments
in our School of Medicine were structured so as not to encourage further
research in gross anatomy. Ken was an expert on many things, one of
which was the management and conservation of academic resources
which he pursued without fear or favor; but I do not think he would have
found a problem in time spent by a retired professor in making a few
more comments on a favorite topic. This essay5 was inspired in part by
French v. Chevron U.S.A.6 The case, and reactions to it different from
mine, has led me to think again about my analysis of the mineral-royalty
* Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law Emeritus, Duke University. I am
pleased to acknowledge assistance in the preparation of this paper by Sharan Goolsby,
Duke University School of Law, 1995.
1. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW 460 (3d ed. 1995).
2. Id. at 129.
3. Richard C. Maxwell, The Mineral-Royalty Distinction and the Expense of Produc-
tion, 33 TEX. L. REv. 463 (1955).
4. Richard C. Maxwell, Oil and Gas Conveyancing-Is There Truth in Labeling? 33
WASHBURN L.J. 569 (1994).
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 448 (Standard ed. 1969) defines "essay"
as "[a] short literary composition on a single subject, usually presenting the personal views
of the author." Literary quality is hard to achieve with a subject such as this but the re-
mainder of the definition describes my objective. I make a point of the word "essay" be-
cause I have no exhaustive law review style examination of cases in view.
6. 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
SMU LAW REVIEW
distinction.7
Some introductory material is necessary to place the problems involved
in context. The rights to oil and gas in the ground can be conveyed by a
landowner giving the grantee all development rights together with the
necessary easements to carry out that development. A landowner can
also create interests which have no development rights but which give
their owner a chance to participate in potential oil and gas production.
The first sentence above describes a mineral conveyance, and the second
describes a royalty conveyance. The first conveyance could rationally
cover one hundred percent of the minerals in the land involved. The sec-
ond must, as a practical matter, be a relatively small fraction of the land's
minerals since it does not share in the expenses of mineral production
and exists as a charge to be satisfied from the totality of that production
when and if it occurs.
If the owner of the entire mineral estate conveys fifty percent of that
ownership to another, the two become tenants in common and must re-
solve the difficulties of that relationship. 8 The interest of both parties is
subject to the expense of production,9 and an agreement for development
setting out the rights and responsibilities of each cotenant can probably
be reached with a minimum of difficulty.
On the other hand, if the owner of all the minerals in a tract of land
conveys fifty percent of the potential production from that land as a roy-
alty, a situation has been created where development may flounder on
the unwieldy rights of the royalty owner if the language creating the in-
terest is taken literally. Such an interest is a charge on the production
from the land after it reaches the surface and after the expenses of pro-
curing that production have been borne by the owner of the right to de-
velop. It will take an unusually cheap and unusually productive well to
make oil and gas operations on a tract so burdened economically
feasible.' 0
A royalty, then, is less than a full mineral interest in conceptual terms
since it encompasses only one attribute of such an interest; but it can be
more than a mineral interest in economic terms when its share is stated as
7. Martha Wach, Duke Law 1994, sent the case to me with a short note: "mineral
bug." The reference was to a teaching device from my oil and gas class in which she was a
student. I will explain the contribution to legal analysis of this excursion into entomology
as my essay develops.
8. LowE, supra note 1, at 84-88.
9. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 573-74 (8th Cir. 1924).
10. Some courts have just not believed that the parties intended to create such giant
royalties and have found them to be something else: an expense-bearing mineral interest
carrying the same fraction. Thus, in Simson v. Langholf, 293 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1956), a con-
veyance of "49% of the oil and gas that may be produced" was read as "49% of all oil and
gas ... in place." Id. at 306. For this result the court cited Lord Coke's dictum: "For what
is the land but the profits thereof?" Id. A less creative approach, but one which holds
conveyancers to a decent standard of precision, is found in Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986), where a conveyance of a "one-half non-participating royalty
interest" was held to create just that, leaving the title examiner who construed the lan-
guage as creating a "1/16th royalty as a defendant in a malpractice action." Id. at 691.
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a share of gross production rather than as a percentage of royalty. Since
a royalty is not expense-bearing, an interest that confers a right to a large
share of potential production is likely to smother the economic value of
the land it burdens unless a compromise can be reached which reduces
such a royalty in exchange for development.,
Investors' interests which are carved out of the underlying mineral es-
tate do not usually involve large fractions of production. The speculative
possibility of oil and gas being found in a particular tract may counsel a
reservation of some sort of interest, royalty or mineral in nature, by the
grantor when land is sold. A landowner may also sell an interest in a
tract that is already producing oil and gas, turning future, speculative
prospects into present cash. These are the transactions that typically gen-
erate the instruments that raise the questions with which this essay is con-
cerned.11 The interests created by these instruments can range from a
tenancy in common in the mineral estate to a share of production with no
executive powers, appropriately called "the stand alone royalty
interest."12
A helpful example of one of these situations is found in Barker v.
Levy,13 where an interest in producing oil land was conveyed to a lawyer
in payment for professional services. The fraction used in describing the
interest was 1/160. A fractional full mineral interest of this size makes
little sense. The owner would be a nuisance factor in negotiations for
future leases since the interest would share the leasing power. The usual
reason for creating a fractional interest of this size is to invest its owner
with a share of production from the underlying mineral estate, not to con-
vey a share of the management or development rights.
If the interest created is classified as royalty, it will entitle the grantee
to 1/160 of the oil produced. If, on the other hand, a mineral interest has
been created, it will be subject to the expense of production. At the time
of the conveyance in Barker v. Levy, the land had been leased with a 1/8
royalty reserved. A 1/160 mineral interest would be entitled to 1/160 of
that 1/8 landowner's royalty. The expense of production was borne by
the mineral estate when the land was leased in a fashion that allocated 7/8
of the minerals to the lessee in return for a 1/8 landowner's royalty unbur-
dened by production expenses. A 1/160 mineral interest conveyed sub-
ject to such a lease is entitled to 1/160 of the 1/8 royalty, or 1/1280 of the
minerals produced. The larger the royalty reserved in the lease, the more
oil and gas the fractional mineral owner will receive. A 1/160 royalty,
11. The usual contract under which land is developed for oil and gas, the oil and gas
lease, creates a "landowner's royalty or lessor's royalty" in the leasing party. LOWE, supra
note 1, at 43 (emphasis in original). This interest, typically one-eighth or one-sixth of the
oil "produced and saved" has raised problems different from those raised by interests
carved out of the underlying mineral rights. The questions subsumed under the heading
"mineral-royalty distinction" are found in the latter type of transactions.
12. See Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Interest in the United States: Not Cut from the Same
Cloth, 29 TULSA L.J. 449, 450 (1994).
13. 507 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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however, will receive 1/160 of the production without regard to the size of
the landowner's royalty that may be in place.14 It will increase only as the
gross amount of production increases.
The actual intent of the grantor in Barker is unknown.' 5 The lawyer/
grantee may have been overpaid by virtue of the royalty classification
'given to the language of the conveyance. The language used, however, is
the classic royalty formula: "a 1/160th part of all the oil, gas, sulphur and
all other minerals that may be produced and saved.' 6 In Texas, such an
interest could be conveyed by the straight-forward designation of a "1/
160 royalty interest," but nuances of language can create problems that
even so simple a solution as calling a royalty a royalty does not
overcome.17
The Barker royalty is the royalty usually referred to when one speaks
of the mineral/royalty distinction. It stands alone.' 8 It is not a land-
owner's royalty, nor is it dependent on any landowner's royalty that may
have been reserved in a lease on the land involved. The terminology
"mineral/royalty distinction" suggests an equality of minerals and royal-
ties, obscuring the fact that a royalty is always dependent on an underly-
ing mineral interest. A sense of symmetry in the terminology may also be
attributable to the fact that the owner of a mineral estate can create frac-
tional interests, with identical fractions, some of them mineral in nature
and some of them royalty in nature. Such an owner can convey a 1/16
mineral interest and a 1/16 royalty interest. The mineral estate from
which the interests were carved' 9 is, of course, now subject to both of
these interests, and they must be taken into account when the land is to
be leased. The impact of each of these interests on the returns to the
owner of the remaining 15/16 mineral estate who leases the oil and gas
14. If the owner of a mineral estate were to create a royalty interest carrying a fraction
greater than a landowner's royalty in place, a breach of the warranty contained in the
conveyancing instrument would occur.
15. See LowE, supra note 1, at 127 ("The major reason that the mineral/royalty dis-
tinction is so hard to deal with is that the courts turn themselves inside out trying to ascer-
tain the intent of the parties.").
16. Barker, 507 S.W.2d at 615 (emphasis added); see also 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 304.7 (1995).
17. In Caraway v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1953, writ
ref'd), the court found that a "fee royalty of 1/32 of the oil and gas" clearly reserved 1/32 of
the oil and gas "received from said property." Id. at 426. Compare, however, Acklin v.
Fuqua, 193 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the
addition of words of mineral significance, such as "the right to enter," made the interest
mineral in spite of the interest being described as "royalty." In Oklahoma, the varying
impact of the word "royalty" has been a factor in creating a body of law aptly characterized
as a "labyrinth." See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, § 307.1.
18. Kramer, supra note 12.
19. The distinction drawn here between interest and estate when discussing minerals is
a matter of relative size. The word "estate" fits best the description of the rights held by
one who is the grantee in.a deed by the owner of the fee simple absolute severing all the
minerals in the land from the surface. If the 1/160 interest in Barker had been character-
ized as "mineral," it would have appropriately been called a mineral "interest" even
though it had all of the attributes of a mineral "estate" except the economic importance
and negotiating power of full or nearly full ownership of the severed minerals.
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reserving a 1/8 landowner's royalty is quite different, however. The
owner of the outstanding 1/16 mineral interest has the leasing power and
should be joined in the lease.20 The 1/16 mineral interest will be entitled
to a share of bonus and rentals, if the lease provides for them, and will
receive 1/16 of the 1/8 landowner's royalty if the land is productive. The
owner of the 1/16 royalty, on the other hand, need not be joined in the
lease and will not share in bonus and rentals, unless they have been spe-
cifically conveyed. 21 The royalty owner is entitled to 1/16 of gross pro-
duction. Its share does not depend on the size of the landowner's royalty.
It will take 1/2 of the 1/8 royalty in this case but will take the same 1/16 of
gross production if the landowner's royalty is 1/6 or any other fraction.
French v. Chevron U.S.A. 22 has a familiar statement of the attributes of
mineral ownership. A "mineral estate" is said to consist "of five interests:
1) the right to develop, 2) the right to lease, 3) the right to receive bonus
payments, 4) the right to receive delay rentals, and 5) the right to receive
royalty payments. '23 Just as total ownership of land is "divided or frag-
mented, ' 24 when the mineral estate is severed from the surface estate, the
mineral estate too can be divided into various interests and combinations
of interests.
It is apparent that the classic image of the "bundle of sticks" 25 is as
useful in describing the content of a mineral estate as it is with the total
ownership of land in fee simple absolute. However, the rather special
nature of oil and gas conveyancing has inspired variations on this theme.
Professor Edwin Homer 26 has used the image of a basket of fruit, and I
have used a less succulent teaching tool, the "mineral bug." The various
appendages of this creature, representing aspects of the mineral estate (or
interest), can be removed from the four-legged bug on a chalk board, one
by one, leaving the body of the bug to represent something that may, on
analysis, be the essence of that estate.27
20. The owner of the fractional mineral interest and its grantor are tenants in com-
mon. Under the majority rule, a tenant in common can remove minerals without liability
for waste, accounting to a passive or non-joining tenant in common for its share of produc-
tion minus the "proportionate share of the costs of operating, after all drilling and comple-
tion costs [have] been recovered." LOWE, supra note 1, at 86-87. The uncertainties of the
standards for the accounting make joinder in the lease highly preferable, whatever the law
of waste may be in a particular jurisdiction.
21. See Ritter v. Harriss, 267 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954), affd,
279 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1955), where an instrument reserved "one-half of one-eighth of the
oil, gas and other mineral royalty that may be produced from said land," and also reserved
"one-half of any bonuses or rentals that may be paid under the terms of any mineral
lease."
22. 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
23. Id. at 797 (citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986)).
24. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTEREsTS 12 (2d ed.
1993).
25. John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Prop-
erty, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1.
26. Letter from Edwin P. Homer, Professor Emeritus, Baylor University, to the au-
thor (Nov. 20, 1995) (on file with author).
27. Maxwell, supra note 4, at 570.
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The mineral bug can be given a development head, a leasing power leg,
a royalty leg, a rental leg, and a bonus leg, all attached to an expense-
bearing body. The device works well in analyzing the common practice of
first conveying a full mineral interest and then verbally stripping away
some of the mineral attributes, to leave something less than a full mineral
interest in the grantee. For example, our mineral bug may have been
divested of its development head and its leasing leg. Is a headless, three-
legged mineral bug still a mineral bug?
French v. Chevron U.S.A. illustrates and, to a degree, answers this and
related questions but leaves room for discussion and, for me, mild criti-
cism. Paragraph I of the deed granted a "1/656.17th interest in and to all
of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under and that may be produced"
from the described land.28 Although there are few, if any, universal
truths to be found in the cases dealing with oil and gas conveyancing, the
above language from French represents a "common method of creating a
mineral interest." 29
Assuming for the moment the mineral nature of the interest created in
the absence of additional language, if this interest joins in a lease in which
a 1/8 royalty is reserved, it will be entitled to 1/656.17 of the 1/8 royalty
and will take the same percentage of delay rentals and any bonus that is
paid for the lease. As has been noted, to leave in so small an interest the
capacity of exercising the leasing power and enjoying its associated rights
complicates future transactions and is not usually desired by either party
to the transaction.
Thus, in French, the creation of paragraph I is cut down in the next.
Paragraph II specifies that "this conveyance is a royalty interest only"
and then states that the interest shall have no right to rentals nor any
control over leasing and development. 30 The grantee's suit claims a roy-
alty; both parties eschew ambiguity and move for summary judgment.31
The dispute is framed in terms of mineral or royalty, but there is no
question of the location of the leasing or development power or of the
right to receive a share of bonus or rentals. These attributes of mineral
ownership have been specifically stated to be absent from the interest
under judicial scrutiny. The grantee's claim of royalty status for its inter-
est is a claim for a greater allocation of production than would accrue to
an expense-bearing mineral interest. Unlike a 1/656.17 mineral interest, a
1/656.17 royalty interest will not take that fraction of a 1/8 landowner's
royalty but will, instead, take 1/656.17 of total production since it is free
of expense of production and thus not tied to what the holder of the leas-
ing power has been able to bargain for in percentage of landowner's roy-
alty.32 The French court, in traditional fashion, states that its "primary
28. French, 896 S.W.2d at 796.
29. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, § 304.5.
30. French, 896 S.W.2d at 796.
31. Id See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, § 304.14, on the reluctance of
courts "to designate oil and gas instruments as ambiguous."
32. Kramer, supra note 12, at 450.
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duty is to ascertain the intent of the parties from the language of the deed
by using the 'four comers' rule."'33
The conflict to be resolved is the reconciliation of "paragraph one,
which appears to convey a mineral estate," with "paragraph two, which
explicitly states that only a royalty interest is being conveyed. '34 The ne-
gations of various mineral attributes in paragraph two are explained as
stating "the consequences of the 'royalty only' description. 35
The court concludes that the interest created by the conveyance in dis-
pute is a "1/656.17 mineral interest with reservation of all developmental
rights, leasing rights, bonuses, and delay rentals. '36 This interest is, says
the court, "in essence, only a royalty interest" as is stated in paragraph II
of the conveyance. 37
As this essay has argued, if the "essence" of the interest is royalty, the
basic question is "how much" is resolved in favor of the grantee who will
take its fractional interest of the total production. The court's analysis in
French meets this problem by noting that "when a deed conveys a royalty
interest by the mechanism of granting a fractional mineral estate followed
by reservations, what is conveyed is a fraction of royalty, not a fixed frac-
tion of total production royalty."'38
Judicial intervention thus seems to supply the "of' that makes the in-
terest expense-bearing in the sense that it shares in production only to the
extent of its percentage of the royalty obtained when the land is leased.
Such an interest does exist. It is sometimes called a Corpus Christi roy-
alty, after the well-known case State National Bank of Corpus Christi v.
Morgan,39 which dealt with a conveyance of "1/2... of the royalty in oil,
gas ... and in all other minerals ... produced ... from the above de-
scribed land."'40 When the land was leased with a 1/8 landowner's royalty
and an oil payment of $48,000 out of 1/8 of 7/8 of production, the grantee
unsuccessfully claimed 1/2 of the oil payment. The court did not see the
issue as calling for a mineral/royalty determination, although the issue
could have been so phrased in a conveyancing structure such as that of
Oklahoma, where the word "royalty" can sometimes mean "mineral." '41
Classifying the interest as mineral, with no limitations, would entitle its
33. 896 S.W.2d at 796 (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991)); see
also Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An
Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1, 65 (1993) (discussing
the four comers canon).
34. French, 896 S.W.2d at 797.
35. Id. at 798.
36. Id. at 797.
37. Id.
38. Id at 798 (emphasis in original).
39. 143 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1940).
40. Id. at 758. The question for decision was the right of the owner of this royalty
interest to participate in an oil payment of $48,000 payable out of 1/8 of 7/8 of production
that was reserved as a part of a leasing transaction in which a 1/8 royalty was also reserved.
The court held that there was no right in the royalty owner to participate in the oil
payment.
41. See supra note 17.
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owner to share in the oil payment without regard to whether that pay-
ment is classified as bonus or royalty. In Morgan, however, the Texas
court adopted the plain meaning of the words "1/2... of the royalty" as
creating a royalty interest and went on to find that the oil payment as
written was bonus and thus not part of a royalty owner's entitlement.
42
A fractional share "of' royalty carries the same percentage of a land-
owner's royalty as does the same fractional share of minerals. The enti-
tlement of a full mineral interest to whatever benefits (bonus, rentals, or
royalty) are reserved in the lease it executes has been pointed out. The
omission of the word "of' in the Morgan conveyance would have
presented the situation of the giant royalty which some courts have cut
down to a workable size by, in effect, adding an "of" to the conveyancing
language. 43
The French opinion can be read as a case in which the court has added
a judicial "of' to a conveyance devoid of that word. The court makes the
standard obeisance to the "intent of the parties [which] must be looked to
and must govern."44 Adding "of" to mitigate a giant royalty and create a
workable transaction might be a rational result of a search for "the pur-
pose or intent of the parties as expressed in the entire instrument," 45 but
no such royalty is involved in French. An allocation of 1/656.17 will not
impede development, whether it measures a percentage of gross produc-
tion or a fraction of landowner's royalty.
The court seems to have found the former, a percentage of gross pro-
duction, when it notes that "the conveyance grants, in essence, only a
royalty."' 46 Paragraph I of French, which purports to grant "an undivided
1/656.17th interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals, in,
under and that may be produced from the following described lands," 47
seems, at that point in the opinion, to be surplusage. The opinion goes
on, however, to describe the subject of its consideration as "an interest in
the nature of a royalty-a mineral interest stripped of appurtenant rights
other than the right to receive royalties. ' 48 Finally, the opinion con-
cludes: "[W]hen a deed conveys a royalty interest by the mechanism of
granting a fractional mineral estate followed by reservations, what is con-
veyed is a fraction of royalty, not a fixed fraction of total production
royalty." 49
42. Morgan, 143 S.W.2d at 758. Cf. Griffith v. Taylor, 291 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1956),
where a 1/8 landowner's royalty plus an additional 1/16 share of production was all to be
shared with the owner of an interest described as 1/2 of royalty.
43. See cases discussed supra at note 10, especially the Gavenda case, where the Texas
Supreme Court refused curative judicial intervention, leaving the parties to take the conse-
quences of the 1/2 royalty that careless drafting had produced.
44. French, 896 S.W.2d at 797.
45. See Kramer, supra note 33, at 44.
46. French, 896 S.W.2d at 797.
47. Id. at 796.
48. Id. at 798.
49. Id. (emphasis in original).
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This judicial analysis can be added to the earlier explanation of the
reservation in the grantor as the "right to receive delay or other rentals,
or any revenues from ... leasing" which the court considered to be a
redundant reservation if "the interests in minerals being conveyed was a
1/656.17 royalty interest, that is, 1/656.17 of all production." 50 Since a
royalty does not include those benefits, the court appears to have pursued
the intent of the parties through the nuances of the wording before it with
minimum reliance on conveyancing formulas and their concomitant la-
bels. It is not fanciful to argue, on this view of the case, that the court
needed the word "of' to round out its conclusion as to the parties' intent,
drawn from the "four comers," so it added the word.51
My reading of French differs from the above analysis. I believe that
French is an example of a process described by Professor Patrick Martin:
"[T]he court has norms of expression by which it measures the language
used by the parties. Use of certain words will be presumed to have cer-
tain meaning and to have intended certain consequences. Those who
wish other consequences will not choose those words."'52 The French
court states that the language in Paragraph I of the deed under considera-
tion "appears to convey a mineral estate. '53 Indeed, the language "1/
656.17th interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under
and that may be produced from the following described lands" 54 is "the
most common method of creating a mineral interest. ' 55 Since an undi-
vided mineral interest bears its share of the expense of producing miner-
als, it automatically takes that percentage of royalty equivalent to its
undivided share of the expense-bearing ownership. The word "of" is not
necessary to bring about this result. Thus, if language is used that creates
a 1/4 mineral interest, and that interest is subjected to a lease reserving a
1/8 landowner's royalty, its owner will share in 1/4 of 1/8 of the produc-
tion from the land involved.
A problem arises, of course, when the mineral language is followed by
other language stripping away some of the mineral elements. To revert to
my classroom example, the question may be asked whether a mineral bug
divested of its development head, and its leasing, bonus, and rental legs is
still a mineral bug, or whether the body takes on the name and character-
istics of its remaining appendage, the royalty leg. With a small fractional
interest involved, the difference may not be crucial, though worth arguing
50. Id.
51. Professor Edwin Homer (see supra note 26), in an able amicus brief supporting
"the motion for rehearing applied for by Petitioner [the grantee] in French," argues "that
the court is in error in inserting the word 'OF' in stating that the grantee received 1/656.17
OF the royalty, unless it is the intent of and purpose to overrule Watkins v. Slaughter [144
Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945)]." Amicus Curiae Brief at 8, French v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995) (No. 94-0377). See infra note 72 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Watkins.
52. Patrick H. Martin, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 37
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1-1, 1-8 (1986).
53. 896 S.W.2d at 797.
54. Id. at 796.
55. 1 WILIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, § 304.5.
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about. If the fraction is large, however, perhaps 1/4 or 1/2, the land may
become unmarketable for mineral development purposes if a royalty clas-
sification is reached.
For example, in the often noted Mississippi case of Harris v. Griffith,56
a deed form was utilized which, unaltered, would have created "a frac-
tional interest in the minerals in place."' 57 The parties made changes that
left bonus, rentals, and the leasing power in the grantors. The court held
that this instrument conveyed "a non-participating royalty" but recog-
nized that it might be called a "non participating mineral interest. '58
Whatever it was called, however, it was "in substance a royalty interest"
to be distinguished from a "non executive mineral interest. ' 59 The latter
was defined "as the right to royalty and to either bonus or rental, or both,
under existing or future leases, the owner of which has no development
right and no executive right."'60
The problem presented to the Harris court by the litigants was the loca-
tion of the power to lease. After determining that the power remained in
the grantor,61 the court commented that "the amount of royalty due" had
not been adjudicated and was open "in the event of a disagreement con-
cerning it."62 There is no report of any such disagreement, but if the in-
terest described in Harris is indeed a 1/4 royalty, it should be entitled to 1/
4 of the gross production, The share of its owner, the grantee, will be free
of the expense of production. There is no "of" in the instrument to justify
speaking of a share of landowner's royalty. A portion of the deed with
which the parties started their drafting process in Harris had a clause pro-
viding for participation in lease benefits, including landowner's royalties,
to the extent of the percentage of undivided interest conveyed. That
clause was stricken. If such a clause is present, there is no purpose in
classifying a "non-participating mineral interest" as mineral or royalty.
The interest will take its percentage of landowner's royalties under the
clause without regard to the mineral/royalty distinction.
56. 210 So. 2d 629 (Miss. 1968). Harris was overruled in Thornhill v. System Fuels,
Inc., 523 So. 2d 983 (Miss. 1988), on the matter of the location of the leasing power. For a
detailed critique of Thomhill, see Maxwell, supra note 4.
57. 210 So. 2d at 633. The printed portion of the instrument described its subject as an
"undivided One-quarter (1/4) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals of
every kind and character in, on or under" the described land. Id. at 631.
58. Id. at 633-34.
59. Id. at 634.
60. Id. at 634 (citing 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, § 301). The passage in
the treatise goes on to state the "contention that a nonexecutive mineral interest is nothing
more than a royalty interest that also shares in bonus and rental." Id Obviously, a "non
participating mineral interest," although not mentioned, should, on this theory, also be
"nothing more than a royalty interest." Whether the interest takes its fraction of gross
production or its fraction of the royalty reserved in a lease is finessed when the treatise
notes that its "description of royalty and nonexecutive interests has proceeded on the as-
sumption that at the time of transfer an oil and gas lease existed ... and that the transfer
created a right to share in benefits under the existing lease or under it and future leases."
Id
61. Note that Harris has been overruled on this point. See supra note 56.
62. 210 So. 2d at 636.
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Thus, in Hasty v. McKnight,63 the grantor of an "undivided One half
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under, and
that may be produced from" described land 64 reserved "the right ... to
lease the minerals ... and to receive all bonus money and delay rentals
accruing therefrom after termination of the existing lease."' 65 The court
found that this language reduced "the mineral grant to a perpetual grant
of a non-participating royalty interest in the tract's minerals. '66
In Hasty, however, the instrument provided that the grantee should
share "one half interest of all of the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty
due and to be paid under the terms of [the present and any future
lease]. ' '67 The "of" is written into the transaction by the parties; it need
not be supplied by an analysis of the instrument as creating a 1/2 mineral
interest which, by its expense-bearing nature, would take its percentage
of a landowner's royalty and not of gross production.
I submit that an analysis leading to a mineral classification with an in-
herent "of" is appropriate in French, although the fraction 1/656.17 is cer-
tainly not destructive of the land's development possibilities. In any
event, if the language before the court calls for the fixation of a particular
label to the interest created by virtue of the "norm of expression" used, 68
the size of the fraction should be irrelevant. Gavenda v. Strata Energy,
Inc.69 is certainly authority for the proposition that, if the court finds lan-
guage that constitutes "a norm of expression," 70 the language will be
given an appropriate meaning unless "a contrary intent is expressed."'71
Watkins v. Slaughter72 was a key case in the argument made by the grant-
ees in favor of a royalty classification in French. Professor Homer argues
that French has overruled Watkins sub silentio. 73 This is indeed a close
question. The cases are much alike. A distinction must turn on the Wat-
kins language that the grantor shall "receive the royalty retained herein
63. 460 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. Id at 950.
65. Id. at 953.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 950.
68. See Martin, supra note 52, at 1-8.
69. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986); see supra note 10.
70. See supra note 52. The "norm of expression" in Gavenda was "one-half (1/2) non-
participating royalty." 705 S.W.2d at 690. The interest created took 1/2 of the gross
production.
71. French, 896 S.W.2d at 797 (citing Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786
S.W.2d 667, 669 n.1 (Tex. 1990), for the proposition that "[w]hen an undivided mineral
interest is conveyed, reserved, or excepted, it is presumed that all attributes remain with
the mineral interest unless a contrary intent is expressed." Day dealt with the question
whether the executive power had to be specifically mentioned to be transferred.).
72. 189 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1945).
73. Homer, supra note 51, at 2. Another able scholar suggested long ago that the
decision in Watkins could turn on the idea that, with the right to lease and to receive bonus
and rentals separated from the interest to be classified, the only thing left is royalty. See
Charles J. Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participat-
ing Royalty and Kindred Interests, 32 TEx. L. REv. 369, 390 (1954).
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only from actual production. '74 This language can be read as an expres-
sion of "contrary intent" which overcomes the language of "normative"
mineral significance which precedes it.75 It arguably expresses an intent
that the interest in question is to receive its share of production only after
the expense of production has been incurred.
My mild criticism of the French opinion is directed toward process, not
result. Paragraph I of the French conveyance, standing alone, should cre-
ate a 1/656.17 mineral interest.76 Paragraph II removes from the interest
described in paragraph I all attributes of a mineral interest which the
court has listed but a right to receive royalty:77 "[it is understood and
agreed that this conveyance is a royalty interest only."' 78 Nothing is said
specifically of the expense-bearing characteristic of a mineral estate. The
court does point out that the words of paragraph II stating that the
"grantee has no control over 'the making of any lease contract to develop
or prospect"' should be read "as reserving the right to develop in the
grantor. ' 79 Has the classic mineral language of paragraph I been obliter-
ated by the statement in paragraph II "that this conveyance is a royalty
interest only?" 80 The court comes close to saying so in its statement that
"[t]he conveyance grants, in essence, only a royalty interest, as stated in
the second paragraph."' 81 That this is not what is meant to be communi-
cated is clarified by the court's statement that the mineral interest created
in paragraph I survives the removal of mineral elements in paragraph II
and becomes "a mineral interest stripped of appurtenant rights other
than the right to receive royalties. '82
The use of such a teaching aid as the mineral bug is somewhat fraudu-
lent unless it can be tied to reality. Thus, one can effectively argue that, if
all mineral elements have been removed in the French conveyance, then
what is left is royalty. A reference to the mineral bug can, in my experi-
ence, help in visualizing the full implications of a conveyance such as that
in French. When the various appendages (or appurtenances) of this crea-
ture are removed, usually leaving a body with a royalty leg, the body
(mineral by virtue of the verbal formula used and bearing the expense of
production) remains and is still mineral, unless the essence of such an
estate has itself been eliminated by other language in the instrument.
74. 189 S.W.2d at 699. The opinion of the court of appeals in French made much of
this "direct language of royalty" in distinguishing the cases. French v. Chevron USA, Inc.,
871 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994), aff'd, 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
75. The mineral language is a "1/16 interest in and to all the oil, gas and other minerals
in and under and that may be produced from said land." 189 S.W.2d at 699.
76. See 1 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, supra note 16, § 304.5.
77. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
78. French, 896 S.W.2d at 796 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 796, 797 n.1.
80. Id. at 796.
81. Id. at 797. Such an interest is characterized by Professor Kuntz as a "non-partici-
pating mineral interest." See 1 EUGENE KuNwz, OIL AND GAS § 15.3 (1962 & Supp. 1994).
82. 896 S.W.2d at 798.
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It is confusing to note that what remains in French is indeed royalty of
a sort, but a royalty that is best described as an interest "in the nature of a
royalty, '83 the essence of which is still mineral, bearing the expense of
production and participating in production as "a fraction of [landowner's]
royalty, not a fixed fraction of total production royalty. '84 It is, however,
comforting to note that, if the fraction of minerals set out in paragraph I
of the French conveyance had been 1/2, the French analysis would not
result in the stripped mineral interest metastasizing into a catastrophic
Gavenda85 royalty of 1/2 the total production. The grantee would be enti-
tled only to 1/2 of the royalty reserved by the holder of the executive
rights with the "of' supplied by the intrinsic expense-bearing mineral
character of the interest, not the court.
To seriously analyze conveyances such as these is not to approve of
them as models of the conveyancer's art. Many of them, of course, are
not the result of a level of skill that can be characterized as art. We have
not, however, chosen a system in which only officially approved docu-
ments are admitted to the property records. For the most part, we have
the freedom to draft in whatever form we wish documents that will have a
permanent place in the land records and take the consequences. The con-
sequences are frequently litigation, which often adds a complexity to our
legal system that can undermine "the ability of the profession to give a
high level of professional service at a price that the public will be willing
to pay."8 6 In my opinion French adds clarity to the law of oil and gas, but
it is clear that judges, lawyers and scholars can and do differ on the dis-
tinction between minerals and royalties.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 10.
86. Richard C. Maxwell, Some Recent Mineral-Royalty Cases-Micro-Law in a Macro-
World, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 545, 553 (1975).
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